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Abstract
With more and more devices becoming connectable to the internet, the num-
ber of services but also a lot of threats increases dramatically. Security is
often a secondary matter behind functionality and comfort, but the problem
has already been recognized. Still, with many IoT devices being deployed
already, security will come step-by-step and through updates, patches and
new versions of apps and IoT software. While these updates can be safely
retrieved from app stores, the problems kick in via jailbroken devices and
with the variety of untrusted sources arising on the internet. Since hacking
is typically a community effort these days, security could be a community
goal too. The challenges are manifold, and one reason for weak or absent
security on IoT devices is their weak computational power. In this chapter,
we discuss a community based security mechanism in which devices mutually
aid each other in secure software management. We discuss game-theoretic
methods of community formation and light-weight cryptographic means to
accomplish authentic software deployment inside the IoT device community.
Keywords: Collaborative Systems, Smart Communities, Trust
Management, Mechanism Design, Applied Cryptography
1. Introduction
The potential of services offered by the future internet of things is accom-
panied by an equally strong growing potential of new threats. The internet
of things induces the trend to turn special purpose devices like TVs, radios,
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etc. into universal platforms able to execute arbitrary pieces of software and
with strong communication abilities. This new power makes them vulnera-
ble to the same types of malware that was previously only seen in classical
computer networks. One of them is ransomware, which although dating back
to the 1980s, sees a revival and is a major pillar of the cybercrime ecosystem
today [1]. Ransomware is typically a weapon against the masses, and with
the goal of pressing money. Advanced persistent threats are on the oppo-
site being highly targeted attacks against specific victims, and typically not
about monetary gain, but to demonstrate the power and to cause maximal
damage. The common denominator of both extremes, and most that live be-
tween these two is their focus on the weakest element, which is typically the
human. Nature itself teaches that flocks (in general communities) have much
higher chances to survive than any of their individuals would have on their
own. Why not adopt and systematize this well-proven behavior in security
and the internet of things? Awareness of humans is a notoriously volatile
state since press and media have an undoubted power in sensitizing people
for a topic, but this regards every topic on which news are reported. So, more
recent news tend to supersede older ones and hence awareness about threats
are continuously fading away due to the mass of information that people are
confronted with every day.
In that sense, the internet of things and, more generally, the information
society itself creates one of the biggest dangers, by constantly overloading
individuals with information so that recognizing the real danger when it
occurs is harder than ever. Can we find a way out of this? There is surely
no easy answer, and societal changes towards better awareness should be
expected to solve the problem in near future. But human communities are
not the only ones that we can create, and the internet of things, which
basically is a community, offers much more controllable dynamics than any
human society.
Speaking more concretely, let us look at a documented case of ransomware,
having locked a TV screen [2]. The issue was apparently due to the installa-
tion of a mysterious app. More critically, the viruses are usually able to jump
between different devices, partly also due to the strong prevalence of only a
few platforms. For example, Android is running on tablets, mobile phones,
eBook readers, TVs and many more. So, there is no technical barrier for a
virulent app to pass from one device to the other. The links are exactly what
IoT provides, so the world is open to any number of viruses to be fruitful
and multiply and infect the world. Indeed, why not turn IoT devices them-
2
internet of things→ smart
community
secure
app
sharing
(sh
are
d) t
hre
at
war
nin
gs
Figure 1: Turning the IoT into a Smart Community
selves into a community in which individuals (devices) mutually inform each
other about threats, countermeasures and securely share apps? Since trust
of humans in technology seems to be high already, why not let the awareness
be up to the devices rather than the people? Figure 1 sketches the vision on
this smart community living in the IoT.
With apps obtainable from various sources, only one of which is the
trusted official app store, drive-by downloads have become a common way
of injecting malware on mobile platforms, and perhaps also future IoT. In a
drive-by download attack, the adversary obtains a legitimate copy of an app
installation file (on Android, this would be an apk-file), unpacks it (as it is
basically a compressed archive), adds the malware, and repacks everything
back into the harmlessly looking app installation file. The unaware victim
obtains the apk-file from some source and installs the app, but also the mal-
ware that unknowingly ships with it. Official key stores run by platform
vendors (like Google, Apple, etc.) perform lots of screenings and security
checks, and a drive-by download is most unlikely for these sources. Still, one
attack vector on IoT and mobile platforms is to disconnect the user from the
official app store (say, by redirecting or blocking the connection somehow),
to enforce the user to look for alternative sources. There are usually many
of them, but not all being equally trustworthy.
More specifically, mobile platforms can be used with mobile device man-
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agement systems (MDMs) that let anyone (primarily enterprises) run their
own app stores, why not turn the community itself into a trusted app store for
itself? While app stores enjoy the luxury of cryptographic security (digital
signatures to verify the originality of the app), those cryptographic security
precautions are not easily established inside a loose community that cannot
perform a proper and decent key management.
Fortunately, there may be not even a strong need for a full-fledged public
key infrastructure to endow an IoT user community with the cryptographic
assurance of mutual authentication and hence trustworthiness in the shared
apps! Indeed, past research has come up with proposals on how to use
keys shared only with friends (or more general, the local neighborhood), to
establish end-to-end authentication (and security) even with strangers with
which no public key data is shared. The community, in turn, should be
formed so that everyone in it has an incentive to contribute, i.e., actively
communicate potential threat discoveries, and actively serve as a trusted
source of data, software, and information for others. The challenge herein is
building the community in the proper way to achieve (cryptographic) security
for everyone. This is two problems, one of community formation, the other on
security establishment. The community can be formed based on incentives
so that it is the best option for everyone in the community to contribute to
it. Suitable mechanisms to this end can be constructed from game theory,
as we will discuss later in this chapter.
2. State of The Art on App Security
Taking mobile platforms as templates as to how IoT devices may look
like in future, the security of mobile devices rests on four main pillars:
1. Screening of apps at app stores: before an app goes online for download,
most app stores scan for malicious code or patterns (similar to what a
virus scanner would do).
2. Access restrictions and permissions by the operating systems: when
an app is installed, usually the required access privileges are displayed
so that the user can explicitly consent. An informed decision hereby
judges the combination of permissions and apps rather than each one
individually, since the sum of permissions is typically much more pow-
erful (dangerous) than each permission is on its own. At this point, care
is up to the user (for example, in becoming suspicious if a torchlight
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app asks for network access; even if this app has no network access
rights, it could share sensitive information via the clipboard with a
“befriended” app from the same vendor that can send away the data).
Newer versions of Android, for example, also allow to revoke such rights
even after installation.
3. App sandboxing: within the mobile device prevents apps from mutually
accessing each other’s memory space or the process itself. Still, there
are several possibilities to let apps talk to each other and exchange
data, which can be exploited maliciously (similar to how the heartbleed
exploit worked for SSL).
4. User awareness: the checks done at the app stores and everything that
the operating system does hinges on the user acting carefully. This
care includes an original (especially not jailbroken) copy of the plat-
form, as well as a careful decision on which app to install. If the app’s
purpose is inconsistent with the privileges that it requires, then this is
an indication of potential danger.
The last pillar is where the community can help the most: it is not always
obvious why an app should not need some privilege, and some paid apps may
have free-of-charge siblings that are simply unofficial and may thus not be
found in an official app store. In both cases, community knowledge can aid
and guide the user. For example, if an app is reported (to the community) as
asking for strange privileges, then a warning could be issued to a new user.
Likewise, untrusted sources can be replaced by the community acting as a
team, thus making it more difficult for the adversary to spread its malicious
content.
Using opinions is already standard in app stores, where apps get user rat-
ings to help others find the best app for their needs. Establishing a similar
system for security appears as a natural next step, and can be achieved us-
ing simple means. In fact, the cryptographic assurance that users get when
retrieving an app over official channels can in a similar way be provided by
(and to) the whole user community, by proper incentive and authentication
mechanisms; the former resting on game theory, the latter rooting in cryp-
tography. Hereafter, we will thus look at ways to safely distribute apps with
cryptographic assurance.
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3. Community Based Security
The basic goal to accomplish for an attacker is tricking an unaware user
into installing an app from a distrusted source. While app stores can easily
certify the genuineness of their items by public key cryptography (digital
signatures), not all software is obtained from these stores, and certificate
management is typically a challenge of its own (despite rich and useful theory
behind it).
Normally, communities rely on one or more authorities for the authentic
distribution of software and threat information (warning) communication.
Why not have the community do that job collaboratively? The conventional
approach to authentication via public key cryptography would require a fully
pervasive public key management in all devices. While this is certainly pos-
sible, the cryptographic operations are expensive (maybe too expensive for
some IoT devices) and the variety of vendors will probably render the entire
architecture quite complex. Symmetric cryptography, on the other hand,
comes light-weight and can be used for authentication based on keys that
need to be established only in the local neighborhood of a device. This sim-
plifies matters and takes out at least one of the central authorities towards
a more decentralized approach.
Also, the sharing of threat notifications and patches can be made up to
the community, in addition to central such news distribution mechanisms.
Essentially, the community can engage in multi-peer credibility checking to-
wards an early warning system about drive-by downloads.
3.1. Multi-Peer Credibility Checking
A drive-by download occurs if an installation package is modified by an
attacker to contain malicious code additionally to the actual (legitimate)
app code. Adding the malware is the simple part, the tricky bit is getting
someone else to download the now malicious app. One way of enforcing this is
disconnecting people from the app store (temporarily), to enforce the search
for alternate sources for an app.
Assume that an app has been originally distributed from a trusted source
in first place, which is – in any case – the app store (hence, its role is equally
crucial also in a community based security approach, as it acts as the initial
point of trust before the decentralized security can come to play). Once the
app – in its legitimate form – has reached some outspread, suppose a user
wants to install it from a given installation package. The open source domain
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offers a simple and effective security precaution in the form of fingerprints:
usually, an installation package is accompanied by several mirrors and a
(cryptographic) hash-sum (often, MD5 or SHA-1). The genuineness of the
downloaded file can be checked by verifying the checksum on the website.
For this to work, the checksum and installation package should come from
different sources, so that the confidence in the verification can be based on
the unlikely event of the attacker having conquered both, the data and the
checksum host(s) at the same time.
Some software systems (like the statistical software R or the package
manager Chocolatey) by default do such a verification, which is no more
expensive than one hash-and-compare operation. IoT devices will not have
much difficulties in offering the necessary computational power to achieve
security by the same technique; relying on the community.
Figure 2 gives an example of this process, where a user X seeks to install
some app on a smart TV. To get the installation package, it issues a call-out
asking for others having installed the app on their (similar) devices. Suppose
devices A,B and C have the app, while device D sees the request but must
remain silent since the app is not available on this device. The peers A,B and
C, however, respond by sending back a fingerprint (hash checksum) of their
locally installed apps. Among the three incoming fingerprints, those from B
and C match, while that of A is different. This is already an indication that
either B and C, or A, must have some malicious version of the app installed.
Going with a majority vote (based on the hypothesis that less infections are
more likely than a pandemic outbreak of the malware), the user would thus
request the app from either B or C (making a random choice), and inform A
about its suspicion to have malware there. In this way, A gets informed, and
can upon next possibility retrieve either a clean version of the app from the
store, or communicate this fingerprint to others to check their own copies of
the app (similar to a signature-based virus scan). Similar techniques are also
deployed for public key management, such as for trust management in PGP
and GPG [3, 4].
Once the user has found a source to get the app from, it must authentically
retrieve it. This can be done by multipath authentication [5].
3.2. Incentive Based Community Formation
It is apparent that the credibility checking proposed relies on community
building, since IoT peers need to establish a trusted neighborhood to ask
for credibility and also to help with the authentication if software shall be
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Figure 2: Multipeer Credibility Checking
deployed. Mechanisms to form these trust clusters can be understood using
agent-based models and game-theoretic tools. The formation of the commu-
nity is dynamic and arises from a network formation process or a cooperative
game. The formation of a trustworthy IoT community plays an essential role
in enabling the collaboration among devices. The community formation is
naturally a dynamic problem in which nodes can join and depart the net-
work and form communities of their interest. This process can be modeled
using a network formation process in which each node is characterized by
its type, preferences, trust, and utility. The type of the nodes refers to the
functionalities, the age and the version of the devices. The devices of the
same type often benefit more from the collaboration. However, devices of
different types can also learn about emerging cyber threats and protection
mechanisms from devices of similar types. Each device has a preference over
the devices that it wants to communicate with. The preferences are depen-
dent on the trustworthiness of the information received from other nodes
and the utility of the collaboration. Based on the preferences, each node can
choose a subset of existing nodes to initiate a request of connections and a
link is formed between two nodes if the request is accepted. The acceptance
of a request can be determined by a node through a cost-and-benefit evalu-
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ation; i.e., a node can determine the collaboration devices through his own
preferences. This request-and-approval process is implemented at each node
at every stage. As a result, a large-scale network is formed in a distributed
fashion. As the parameters of the system change, nodes can terminate their
collaboration with other nodes and establish new collaborations over time.
In addition, new nodes will join the network and the existing nodes can leave
the system. Hence the networks formed are highly dynamic. The emergence
of the community of the dynamic network indicates the formation of the col-
laboration community. One important phenomenon that we observe is the
homophily, in which nodes of the same types often form a community and
share information together. Game-theoretic methods can be used to form an
agent-based model to predict the structure of the network and the emergence
of the communities by analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Incentive mechanism design is an important tool to create incentives in
the network so that nodes actively share information with other nodes trust-
fully and untrustworthy devices or free-riders will be isolated and discon-
nected from the network. In the recent work of [6], mechanism design tools
enable the system to reach a desirable and unique Nash equilibrium that
allow devices to communicate in a conducive environment in which nodes
endeavor to contribute knowledge and resource to assist connected nodes in
the community. Any selfish or free-riding behavior will receive a tit-for-tat
response from the nodes in the community as a consequence. In this way,
healthy and growing collaborative communities will be achieved and main-
tained. Mechanism design tools can also shape the size and the structure
of the network. With an appropriate design of incentive parameters, the
network can grow to a desirable size by encouraging the participations from
new devices. The connectivity and clustering of the community network can
also be controlled by creating supernodes that behave as information hubs
and incentivizing nodes to reach unconnected devices that can benefit from
joining the community.
3.3. Multipath Authentication
Let an IoT device have made contact with its neighborhood in the net-
work, i.e., any “surrounding” device that responds upon some sort of “Hello-
Message” sent out upon the first connection (a direct connection could, for
example, use a time-to-live set to 1 in order to get only the adjacent network
devices; but farther distances are equally possible and legitimate here).
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Suppose that a new IoT device makes a handshake with its network neigh-
bors, and establishes a shared secret for later authentication. The pairing
can be done by any means, such as via firmware, Bluetooth, near field com-
munication, etc. Preferably, it can be even done at manufacturing time for a
whole production lot, so as to achieve a distribution in (geographic) proxim-
ity but in highly diverse networks (different homes, distinct enterprises, etc.).
In (smart) homes, for example, this avoids all paired devices to communicate
over the same potentially compromised hub, since the paired devices are lo-
cated in different areas and under control of independent users. The mutual
finding of two IoT devices can, relative to network segmentation, firewalls or
other logical barriers, happen as a particular service on the application layer,
which needs to be allowed to run over the IoT. However, communicating
devices are the main purpose of IoT anyway.
In any case, note that unlike for general public key schemes, our schemes
do not require as frequent key updates over the lifetime as IoT device. For
mobile phones, as an example, an expected lifetime of 2 to 3 years (until
it is replaced by a more modern version) could make a key update even
unnecessary at all.
The idea of multipath authentication is the following: if B wants to send
an authentic message to A, but has neither a shared key nor public-key cer-
tificate from A, it employs its network neighbors to certify B’s identity to A.
To this end, B shares a (distinct) key with each of its neighbors, and attaches
a set of message authentication codes (MACs) to the data for A, indicating
who A should contact to have each MAC verified. Upon reception of the
data and MACs, A can contact each neighbor of B and ask for a verification
of the MACs. This validation process somewhat resembles how handwritten
signatures are verified in real life upon leaving a signature sample that can
be compared to the handwritten signature in question. Electronically, the
process can be run just alike, at the appeal of coming cheap, since the most
expensive operation is the key exchange (done only once), but all subsequent
operations being fast and efficient algorithms from symmetric cryptography.
The security of the scheme, unlike that of public key cryptography, can
be made independent of unproven mathematical conjectures and rests only
on the assumption of a “sufficiently small” portion of the network having
been compromised. In that sense, the achievable security is “unconditional”.
This avoids complicated assumptions that can make public key cryptography
somewhat opaque to people outside the expert community (thus, adding
negatively to the trust in these feelingly black boxes); see [7] for an excellent
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introduction and discussion of the issue. Finally, we remark that the way of
proving security uses game-theory at the core [5].
Experimental Implementations
The concept of multipath authentication has previously been implemented
and demonstrated to work on layer 7. In [8], a demonstrator has been re-
ported that implements arbitrary secure end-to-end communication (confi-
dential and authentic) between devices where only locally paired ones share
a common secret (in an IoT setting, exchanging these is possible in various
ways, such as QR codes, near-field communication, etc.). The main assump-
tion upon which the security rests is multi-path source routing, where paths
do not intersect. Given a sufficiently dense network and accurate information
on the topology, it is not difficult to let the devices do the routing on the
application layer (as was shown in [8], where a local Java client was used to
handle these matters). Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the past prototype,
which is (cryptographically) lightweight and implemented in Java to run on
all platforms. The screenshot shows parts of the log of a protocol run where
node 2 was asked by node 5 to verify the MACs that node 2 received from
node 1. Node 5 shares a secret with node 1 so that it can confirm (see the
“boxed” part on the bottom of the window) that the MAC it computed using
the secret shared with 1 matches what it received from 2 upon the authen-
tication request. Thus, node 1’s “signature” is verified by node 2 and this is
told to node 5.
4. Proposed Architecture
Suppose a user wants to install an app. The user has retrieved the app
from somewhere (not the app store), so that the source is distrusted (typi-
cally indicated by a digital signature verification failure). What if the user
for whatever reason decides to need the app anyway? Where to get it from?
Apps retrieved from the internet directly are usually not subject to the thor-
ough screenings that app stores apply. In that case, the risk is fully taken
by the user. Why not rely on community knowledge and resources in that
case? The idea is the following: To retrieve the app (from elsewhere than
the app store but still from a trusted source), the user (device) X performs
the following steps:
1. Call out to the community for “Who’s got ‘this app’ ?”
11
Figure 3: Multipath Authentication Prototype from [8]
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2. Some (perhaps many) devices may respond by sending a confirmation
to have the app and sending the fingerprint (hash of the app file), upon
which a set of h1, . . . , hn arrives at the user. Devices that are too old
should be abandoned from that list e.g. if their key length (for calcu-
lating the MACs in step 5 is less than the current recommendations.
3. The user X goes for a majority vote and uses the hash that appears
the most among h1, . . . , hn, following the hypothesis that the malware
has not yet affected too large parts in the community. Let hi be that
majority value received from the i-th respondent. Let the user having
sent hi be called B (as in Figure 4).
4. If any of the hashes mismatches another, then we have an indication of
some malware potentially being around in the community.
5. To retrieve the app, X contacts B to send the app with fingerprint hi
as known from step 4. User B then runs multipath authentication to
send an authentic version of the app. In Figure 4, B attaches MACs
using the keys shared with its neighbors and sends the app file with
the MACs to X. This one compares the fingerprint of the received
app to match what it should be (namely hi), and asks then (indicated)
neighbors of B to verify the hash of the app and the MAC attached to
it. This prevents B from sending a correct fingerprint but a malicious
version of the app later (since the fingerprints would mismatch then),
and assures X the authenticity of B’s app packet.
The plain protocol can be adapted towards a less stringent yet no less
informed behavior, in case that users are willing to accept a certain residual
risk in the retrieval process. If so, then quantifying that risk is the major
objective, and done as follows:
Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . .} represent the community, with physical member
IDs being numbers. To each member i ∈ N of the community, we associate
a trust value based on the following intuition: if, in the above protocol, a
user X may query another user B asking to respond to a MAC verification.
Ultimately, the user X is interested in the trustworthiness of the retrieved
app; let us call this event T ∈ {0, 1}, where T = 0 is zero trust and T = 1 is
full trust. Ultimately, we are interested in the distribution of T over the unit
interval [0, 1], conditional on the information available to X, i.e., our trust
measure is τ = Pr(app is trustworthy|user i says so), or more compactly,
τ = Pr(T = 1|R). Note that X polls only a subset of app sources/users
u1, . . . , un ∈ N , so that the probability space in which T lives will not be
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partitioned by the events Ri associated with the peers in the protocol. To
fix this, we replace T by TX,B, as being the subjective trust level that user X
assigns to the app retrieved from user B, based on the information available.
This (conditional) random variable has its probability space partitioned by
the users that X contacts, but the fix comes with the caveat of the objective
trust T remaining out of reach, with only the subjective trust TX,B assigned
by X being computable. The distribution of TX,B, however, follows from the
law of total probability,
Pr(TX,B) =
n∑
i=1
Pr(TX,B = 1|Ri) Pr(Ri). (1)
Mechanism design is herein concerned with the question of why a user
should be willing to honestly participate in the protocol. The incentive for
user i to respond correctly, by (1) is positively correlated to the subjective
trust that user X obtains from asking user i. Since i is, by construction,
B’s neighbor, whatever i reports back depends on the trust that i has in
B. But the situation is symmetric: i has an incentive to answer faithfully
about B, since whichever information or app is ever retrieved from i, B is
perhaps among the neighbors to be queried, so if i refrains from responding
or responds incorrectly, it may indirectly damages its own reputation in the
long run. The same symmetry, however, cannot straightforwardly be used
by a malicious i to damage B’s reputation, since there is still the set of other
neighbors that may indicates B’s honesty (recall that the protocol goes for
the majority vote among all the replies).
Practically, we have a triple of trust values, which X maintains about the
community:
1. The likelihood Pr(Ri) that user i responds. Based on whether or not
i participated in the above protocol, X can update the trust value for
i accordingly. If i refuses to reply about B, B can later refuse to tell
about i, which is i’s indirect incentive to become active.
2. The likelihood Pr(TX,B = 1|Ri) that user i’s reply was correct and
helpful. This value is updated upon the outcome of the majority vote
made along the protocol, as discussed before.
3. The trust value Pr(TX,B = 1) computed from (1), based on the previous
two items.
This form of app retrieval is designed towards simplicity and security at
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Figure 4: Multipath Authentication
the same time: note that the community – by collecting and comparing app
fingerprints – continuously builds up some sort of threat intelligence. Note
that the hash in step 1 and the MAC in step 5 cryptographically link the app
discovery and the app download. Otherwise, a malicious device may present
one (harmless) app at step 1 and another (malicious) one at step 5 (cf. time
of check to time of use – TOCTTOU [9]).
The bandwidth increase is the primary price to pay for this scheme to
work, but remember that all we need to exchange are cryptographic hash
values, which are only a few bytes long. For a quick calculation: using a
224 Bit SHA-3 checksum (state of the art) and with 10 peers contacted, the
following bandwidth is required: we have 10×224 bit ≈ 2 kBit for the initial
call out. Now, if the app sender upon request uses 10 of its neighbors to
verify its authenticity, we end up with a total of 2 kBit for the 10 MACs,
and another 10× 2× 224 bit ≈ 4.5 kBit for all verifications. Thus, a total of
less than 10 kBit of overhead is required for 10 neighbors (more or less peers
induce a proportional increase or decrease respectively).
We finally stress that this entire scheme can be constructed on Layer 7,
i.e., no deep changes to the devices or their network stack is necessary. In
fact, a demonstration prototype of multipath authentication (in the natural
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combination with multipath transmission) has been successful already.
The local management of keys is herein aligned with the app sandboxing
implemented on all commercial mobile phone platforms. General IoT de-
vices are expected to run the same (or at least similar) operating systems.
Platforms like Android enforce sandboxing towards preventing apps from ac-
cessing the memory blocks assigned to other apps. Thus, the cryptographic
keys are essentially locally safe by logic access control by the operating sys-
tem.
5. Outlook
The system discussed in this article already has close relatives up and
running to warn users about malicious websites or changed/outdated public
key certificates [10, 11, 12]. Provided that such technology does not itself
exhibit unwanted behavior otherwise (like unauthorized data collection), why
not use similar technology in the IoT?
Hacking and threat intelligence are community actions, and so should se-
curity and mutual protection be. Large (animal) populations protect them-
selves by forming herds and IoT devices can do similar things to harden the
whole community against external threats. We believe that a comprehensive
security concept should not exclusively rest on cryptographic mechanisms,
but should to a wide extent include incentive and credibility-driven mecha-
nisms to let users (devices) collaborate to the good of everyone. A combi-
nation of mechanism design [13], game theory and cryptography can make a
start here, but the diversity of the IoT seems to call for a scientific treatment
with tools that are equally diverse.
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